Issue #42, 2012

Alexandru Polgár

Let us start with a few cautions.

This is not a “scientific“ essay, and I am not going to offer any interesting numbers and quotations supporting the few thoughts I would like to share with those interested in what actually happened in 1989 or, rather, as “1989“, as the event erroneously recorded by history as the “fall of communism“.

If there is a documentable bibliographical area that constitutes some sort of basis for what I have to say, it holds rather in two names, which both belong to so-called “contemporary philosophy“, but are today equally and infamously out of fashion: Martin Heidegger and Gérard Granel.1 The central thought to which I will refer my attempt at interpreting “1989“ is that of “historicity“ (Geschichtlichkeit, historialité), which supposes that there is a deeper structuring behind the actual course of history than that proposed by various models or periodizations invented in historiographic studies. This deeper or rather just different structuring has to do with something that Heidegger has called an “age of Being“ – a paradigm of meaning that “gives“ a common shape or formality to various practices belonging to such an age: from art to sciences, from politics to religion. I put the word “gives“ in quotation marks because it is impossible to retain here its full meaning. An age of Being is not a Cause that produces effects, but rather an abstract theoretical construction meant to draw attention upon the fact that there is some sort of strange co-belonging of practices occurring in a certain age. This co-belonging is readable, according to Heidegger, in a number of features that must be called, in spite of the immediate ambiguity of the term today, “onto-logical“, insofar as they exceed simple artistic “periods“ or scientific “paradigms“, for instance, as defined by art theory or epistemology. For Heidegger, all features of modernity are reducible to something he called the “essence of modern technology“2 (the famous Ge-stell),which allows for delimiting modernity not only as a historical period, as it is usually theorized by various social sciences, but as an age resulting from the occurrence of a new meaning of Being (of “to be“), which also triggers
– or, rather, “manifests“ itself in – a new definition of being-human (modern “humanity“ as the subject of action and knowledge3), as well as in a new definition of “world“ (as nature) and knowledge (as systematic representation of natural laws), etc. Ge-stell, in a nutshell, means that all beings are interpreted from a basic meaning that posits (reveals, un-covers, pro-duces) Nature as something to be “owned and mastered by man“ (as Descartes put it). Hence our positive sciences,

which are so not because they would oppose a science that would be strangely “negative“, but because they repeat the fundamental matrix of modern science in general, wherein an essential split between a positing subject and a posited object is at work as the basic presupposition of scientific attitude as such. Nevertheless, Ge-stell does not refer only to scientific attitude, but also describes the transformation of beings into a resource of human manipulation (for instance, in economy), as well as the emergence of modern (global) market as a regulator of how we relate to beings.4 In brief, Ge-stell’s generality covers all modern phenomena from the point of view of what commands them as their central principle: the calculations
of market.5

Granel, in his turn, complicates the thought of Ge-stell, of “the essence of modern technology“, by grafting onto it Marx’s notion of Capital,6 about which he demonstrates that it refers, in fact, not primarily to “really existing“ capitals (financial, industrial, and commercial), but to the principle that stands behind them all, that of a limitless accumulation or production of a teleological and, simultaneously, limitless or infinite wealth.7 For Granel, modernity is, from the point of view of historicity, the regime of the Infinite, of which infinite production of infinite wealth
is only an example, even though an essential example that provides us with the generative matrix of all modern phenomena.8

In the light of all this, one could interpret “1989“ as the actual historical accomplishment of infinite production (or, using its more pedestrian name, capitalism), while so called really existing “socialist“ or “communist“ regimes (I will return in
a second to these quotations marks) could be described as regimes of a somehow finite production (at least virtuallyand at the most obvious ideological level). This would be, in brief, the guiding thought (or “thesis“) that I would like to unfold in what follows.

In order to do this I would start by interrogating a little the reason behind our meeting (“post-communism, twenty years later“).9

By this interrogation, my intention is not that of raising some vague suspicion about the theoretical and political legitimacy of such a looking backat our most recent history. Nevertheless, it is not easy for me to agree with using uncritically terms such as “socialism“, “communism“ or, for that matter, “post-communism“. Not that all these terms would have been used “fraudulently“ during the entire 20th century, but, to my mind, it is quite clear that every regime that claimed
to be “communist“ in a way or another actually falsified the liberating core of
the “specter“ (however fragile or unrecognizable such a core might have become today, in our so-called“post-communist“times). For, communism – as an attempt at abolishing production based on private property, as well as the separation between producers (laborers, workers) and their means of production – does not exhaust itself in replacing the “free market economy“ with a production based on state private property (since I believe it is high time to notice that “state property“ is just as private – reserved – as regular capitalist property, especially when it is safeguarded by a repressive apparatus that keeps away actual producers from essential decisions regarding the aims and structure of production). Since a communist emancipation in this most basic sense did not occur in “really existing“ (really? existing?) “communist“ societies, one could hardly speak of an “actual communism“ worth of its name. Hence, “post-communism“, as a relative term, seems to be just as erroneous.

As one can see, even such a minimal caution towards the very terms of our debate brings to light a very particular logical (linguistic, semantic) situation about which we might already sense that “it does not go without saying“, even though in the world of human and social scientists, from historians to transitologists of all kinds, such a question might appear as a perfectly sterile wrestling with words. But there is nothing to do against this: scientists seem to believe today only in the voodoo-like numerology of their countless statistics. Of course, when I utter such things
I could not defend myself against the “scientific“ mantra of our age (shared equally by neo-Marxists or just neo-left-wing theorists, as well as by all sorts of political scientists), and my attitude could pass as some sort of reactionary obscurantism.
It would be almost worthless to remind that statistics of all sorts and, in general, quantitative analysis, in spite of their felicitous and extremely useful precision, are first and foremost interpretation, and belong to the more general phenomenon of political comprehension, of which all scientists know that it can never be politically neutral. My attitude, in fact, does not want to say that “science“ is futile, but rather that “science“ (or its appearance as “statistics“) is not the only mode of thinking that is relevant for understanding the fundamental social, political and economical processes that constitute our post-1989 history. There is another.

Unfortunately, today one cannot claim that this other mode of thinking, traditionally called “philosophy“ (a name increasingly harder to use in a traditional sense), would be simply “available“ or “at hand“ for socio-political “applications“. Unlike science, philo-sophy, in its marked distance from “wisdom“, must invent itself against the background of a tradition that is by no means a depository of “methods“ similar to regular modern sciences (natural or human). In other words, philosophy lacks the algorithms of scientific attitude that make possible a quantitative and qualitative representation of facts. Philosophy’s most proper task is
to determine the task of thinking, to find an answer to the question “what is to be thought?“ In brief, this means to throw the matter of thinking itself into sheer insecurity, while, for science, such questions are already decided (and secured): thinking is a psycho-physical process occurring in the brain and the task of thinking is to represent “reality“ as it is. In this sense, for scientists of all sorts the existence of “communism“ and “post-communism“ is just as clear-cut as any other scientific fact. I am not saying that this is not the case also for some philosophers, but I claim that the thinker’s task in both science and philosophy is to ask: was “it“ truly communism? Is “it“ truly post-communism? These two questions come logically before any sort of assessment of the two decades that came after 1989, since the question itself: “post-communism, twenty years later“ already contains these two presuppositions: that “it“ was communism, that “it“ is post-communism.

The camp of those who truly believe that really existing communism was Communism is quite wide. After all, this answer has on its side Marx’s and Engels’ famous dictum that communism is not an ideal to which reality should be adjusted, but the actual workers’ movement itself. In fact, the appearance that so-called “communist“ states were not only initially, but in their entire historical development
a result of this movement is one of the first preconditions for the identification of really existing communisms/socialisms with Communism as such. However, the main point behind such identification is today to prevent workers of all sorts from fighting for a more advantageous social arrangement for their kind. If communism, in its totality, has been extinguished in its historical failure, it means that communism as such is impossible, and the socio-political order that makes people work for the ultimate profit of an ever growing wealth (that is, against themselves and their liberation from this fundamental social matrix) is the only one we have and couldever have. This is why it is so important for the enemies of a classless society to establish the ideological consensus that communism actually exhausted itself in the experience of really existing (self-declared, self-baptized) “communisms“ or “socialisms“ in East and West. But what if communism did not exhaust itself in the manifold historical experiences that occurred under its banner?

I claim that in spite of the fact that the force of the communist idea, which is that of a more or less progressive, more or less violent reorganization of capitalist production, has increasingly lost its power of mobilization among actual wage workers, the truth of the class split that constitutes the fundamental generative matrix of our society is just as timely-untimely as ever. Did really existing “communisms“ or “socialisms“ manage to solve the matter of this social split? This question requires from us to think about another: does it matter, from the point of view of the socio-political division between a capitalist-function and a proletarian-function in production, whether the capitalist-function is fulfilled by an individual or a state? The answer, to my mind, is that, as long as the social split endures, the actual social composition of the capitalist pole is indifferent (as I was saying, property is just as private, that is, reserved to one pole in its usage as a means of production, regardless the actual persons or mechanisms that organize the privation of workers from their means of production). This is one of the main arguments why really existing “communisms“ or “socialisms“ cannot be granted their claim to have been the historical realization of communism.

As a result of this way of reasoning “post-communism“ is not something that comes after “communism“, but a rather strange sort of post-capitalism.

Of course, this thought has nothing terribly new. It is rather the consequence of applying the category of “state capitalism“ (used in the socialist movement since the 19th century, from social democrats to council communists and Lenin himself)
to the rețection upon the historical situation of “really existing communism“.
Most recently, and in direct relationship to the thinking of the post-1989 condition, the term was brought up again most convincingly by the Hungarian philosopher
G. M. Tamás,10 to whom I owe this line of interpretation. In one of his latest writings, however, Tamás explains that it is not enough to term “really existing communism“ (or rather “socialism“, says he) “state capitalism“, but is important to pay heed to the quite particular sort of state capitalism that was erected by the so-called “communist“ regimes.11 Although this detail is extremely important when the task is that of describing the precise socio-economic model applied in Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R. and elsewhere, since there were quite significant differences between individual countries, the truly decisive “fact“ for the type of meditation
I try to organize here is nevertheless the idea that, in spite of all attempts at building a “socialist“ enclave or alternative worldview within the confines of the territory delimited by the Iron Curtain, “really existing communism“ (= “socialist state capitalism“) was not able to perform a truly significant separation from the capitalist world. The socialist world was much less isolated from global economy than a term such as the “Iron Curtain“ would suggest. This is a fact all serious economists and social scientists know or should know.

If “communism“ could preserve for a long time the ideological illusion that its highest aim was to build a society based on a truly different worldview (implying, consequently, a different sort of “globalization“), even the most unprepared theoretical eye can notice that in terms of the basic interpretation of “reality“ (or, in fact, “Being“, to start moving towards Heidegger), of “man“ and “world“ (as “nature“ and, consequently, as “natural resource“), as well as of the “meaning of life“ (= production, always doubled, of course, by the ideological claim of “building a communist society“), there were, in fact, very little differences between the “capitalist“ world and the “communist“ world. This is what Heidegger described in his Introduction
to Metaphysics
as the “metaphysical sameness of Russia and America“.12

Before attempting to dig myself deeper into what sort of truth formation announces itself in this more than curious coincidence between the two different types of sameness that can be drawn between “really existing communism“ and “free market capitalism“ (the sameness diagnosed from the vantage point of “state capitalism“ and that diagnosed from the vantage point of “metaphysics“), I would like to remind here that, in the place I mentioned,
Heidegger speaks of the same frenzy of economic exploitation of “resources“ (whereby “everything“ becomes a resource) in its meeting with the technological mode of thinking. Heidegger can establish so surely the metaphysical sameness of “Russia“ and “America“ because he is scrutinizing these two world political entities from the vantage point of his notion about the essence of modern technology. Nevertheless it is crucial that this sameness is metaphysical, that is, using a more specifically Heideggerian term, onto-logical, one that concerns the underlying interpretation of Being that is at work in the setting up of Russia and America as world political projects. This sameness does not prohibit, of course, the well-known differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in what concerns social organization, details of everyday life, the practice of power, etc.

However, there is a consequence of this sameness that a later text by Heidegger, which reasserts the sameness, seems to make almost unfathomable. In his “Letter on Humanism“, Heidegger speaks of the world historical importance of communism,13 but he leaves this thought in an exemplary indetermination, which is all the more disquieting insofar as a metaphysical sameness between “Russia“ and “America“ would imply, if I am not totally wrong, that their world historical relevance is also the same. However, since I already mentioned that for Heidegger the same does not mean identical, one could interrogate even further, that is, beyond the obvious differences between “Russia“ and “America“, whether there is, perhaps, also a world-historical difference between the two. This would mean to consider communism and capitalism as two different ways of populating the matrix of Ge-stell. If one sticks to this essential non-identity of the two, Heidegger’s thesis would translate as follows: “communism“, as an allegedly different sort of embodiment of Ge-stell, of the un-veiling of Being and beings commanded by the essence of modern technology (this would be my thesis), does, in fact, not differ essentially from the un-veiling at work
in capitalist representative democracy, but is not identical with it either. Arguably, this makes it rather difficult to see what would be the more specific world historical importance of communism, since from the point of view of “world“, a concept that captures in Heidegger the fundamental situation of un-concealment that characterizes our mode of being (Da-sein), “communism“ or, rather, communism (since Heidegger is one of those thinkers who do not seem to make the difference between “really existing communism“ and what is un-real – not utopian, but principled
– in the communist “idea“) belongs to the same modern world to which “capitalism“ belongs. Here, from a strictly “scientific“ point of view, the debate risks becoming then even more “theological“ or “scholastic“ than in the attempt at clarifying the word “communism“ and its capability of doing justice, alone, that is: without further explanations, to what is known as “really existing communism“.

The difficulty here comes from grasping the precise meaning of the expression “world historical“ in Heidegger. This term originates in Hegel and Marx, as a fundamental concept of their thought, but seems to go through a significant change in Heidegger. The latter attempted to clarify his different meaning of “world history“ in the last paragraphs of Being and Time, taking as a point of departurehis
re-worked notion of “world“ (un-veiling, disclosure, un-concealment, Lichtung, alétheia).14 This notion is not simply “new“ as something previously unheard-of is “new“ (even though nobody else has thought before about connecting the basic simplicity of un-concealment and the historicity or temporality of Da-sein). The history of world differs from “world history“ as “the history of Being“ differs from “universal history“, where the latter is still a more or less historiographic concept, even if radicalized by Hegel in his notion about the self-development of Spirit
or by Marx in his concept of production understood as an “engine of history“.
The relationship between these two different views on history (the Heideggerian and the Hegelo-Marxian) is not exclusive (Heidegger’s concept does not come
to simply replace Hegel’s and Marx’s thought), but, as the “Letter on Humanism“ demonstrates, dialogical (hence the famous “dialogue with Marxism“ and “Hegelianism“ that Heidegger speaks of).15 This detail is important insofar as
it makes perfectly clear that what guides Heidegger’s efforts is not a simple “methodological choice“. A “methodological choice“ in general always supposes
a redefinition of (scientific) certainty, a paradigm shift that manages to come up with a better explanatory hypothesis about a number of facts and their interrelatedness. This is not the case for Heidegger, who, unlike Hegel or Marx, draws a clear line between “thought“ and “science“.16 The difficulty that comes to light in Heidegger’s efforts is related to the enigma of the un-concealmentthat world is. There are, in fact, no possible further explanations beyond the simplicity of world as an un-veiling, dis-covering horizon of everything that pertains to our mode of being. World is, thusly, a level of logical primitiveness impossible to reach from the point of view of a theory that supposes man as a subject and world (= nature + culture) as an object of knowledge, this very split being a way of missing the simple fact that there is world. It is the very existence of world that comes before any comprehension of world. As a horizon of disclosure,17 world is not the objective totality of beingsposited by the metaphysical tradition (the always virtual omnitudo realitatis). On the contrary, metaphysics erects itself on distorting the basic “fact“ of disclosure (which is not a fact among others, but the fact that gives us all other “facts“) in favor of “cultural world“, “a world of man“, a “world of the subject“ (as this can be documented in both Hegel and Marx18). Therefore, world history for Heidegger is not the history of human deeds, but the succession of ages of Being, the orderly modification of the fundamental matrix (“interpretation of Being“) that holds together such ages in the history of Being. This matrix can be highlighted by following the shifts brought by a certain age in the definition of man and its surrounding. It is from the point of view of such a matrix that the metaphysical sameness of Russia and America can be affirmed at all, but it is from the same point of view that a world-historical non-identity between communism and capitalism (which is my thesis, not to be confounded with Heidegger’s thought, I repeat) becomes, therefore, almost impossible to grasp. This is where I believe that Granel will come in handy, but not before trying to corroborate Heidegger’s intuition about the metaphysical sameness between “Russia“ and “America“ with the hypothesis that it is, in fact, a form of capitalismthat fulfils itself in the historical development of really existing “communism“. As it will become clear soon, this is also a possible path for introducing Granel’s thought about the fundamental matrix of modernity.

We have seen that a certain difference between “free market capitalism“ and “really existing communism“ could be traced in what concerns the actual ownership/power over capital or, rather, the particular configuration of the socially, politically and economically constitutive separation between laborers and their means of production. This is how we arrived to the general formula of state capitalism, even though there were significant differences between the various forms of state capitalism in the so-called socialist bloc. If we add to this Heidegger’s notion about the metaphysical co-belonging of “Russia“ and “America“, we arrive to the following question: what exactly, from “state capitalism“ as such, could allow for articulating a metaphysical difference of world historical significance between the “really existing specter“ and “free market capitalism“?

In his “Age of the World Picture“, Heidegger suggests that, understood most properly, the concept of “worldview“ (Weltbild) is about the fact that the world becomes an image,19 something rationally projected and presented as some sort of model to be achieved. As it is not hard to notice, the details of such a world-image are quite obviously different in the case of “free market capitalism“ and “state capitalism“. While both suppose something to be called technological progress, military development and increasingly extended commodity production, in “free market state capitalism“ these basic pillars of the social order are regulated by the “market“, and the tendency is to build a state that apparently acts primarily as a legal and coercive frame for the free development of market. Grosso modo, this is the idea of minimal state, something that (neo-)liberal, capitalist democracy calls “freedom“, although it is true that this basic “freedom“ of the market is enhanced with a certain number of civil rights, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom to travel, etc. One would believe that this “liberal freedom“ is an essential feature
of the difference between “free market capitalism“ and “planned economy“, and while this is probably not completely false at the most superficial political level, as soon as one focuses on the actual political value of this freedom in its developed, current form (finally unchecked by the old adversity between a “capitalist bloc“ and a “communist bloc“), it would appear that the power of citizens to change what they deem to be unjust or simply inconvenient in the political order is not very different in the two regimes. The difference between them consists, in fact, only in the obviousness of oppression: manifest in state capitalism, concealed in free market capitalism. Scrutinized carefully, in spite of all ethical and moral cosmetics, the various freedoms provided by the liberal capitalist order are those that do not bother the absolute power of market, which is embedded in the frame of a state power just as remote from the ințuence of ordinary citizens as its “totalitarian“ counterpart. Modernstate as such is “total“ (encompassing all aspects of social life) – this is not a particularity of “really existing communism or socialism“. Thusly, the ideological difference between “freedom“ and “un-freedom“ does not help in grasping the more specific metaphysical, onto-logical difference in the two forms of social, political and economical organization generically called “Russia“ and “America“ by Heidegger.

For Granel, Heidegger’s notion of Ge-stell seems insufficient in rendering the essence of modernity, but by no means useless. On the contrary, it is only on
the basis of Ge-stell (the essence of modern technology as a mode of disclosing beings) that one can understand how what Marx has called “Capital“ shifted into the law of the (modern) world. Granel combines the features of Ge-stell and those of Capital in his own concept of “Production“ and, partially rejecting Marx’s model of historical explanation,20 claims that what is essential to modern times is that they are times of apeiron, of the unlimited or infinity,21 whereby a strange disturbance inscribes itself in the network of the world order: the secondary (say, the economical) becomes the primary (say, the political), while the world itself and
its “content“ become a matter to be dissociated from their actual forms – that is, limit(ation)s – and moldable according to the fictions of politics, economics, ideology, science, etc.22 From the point of view of this complex notion of Production
(or Production-Infinity as I believe that it should be termed), one can highlight better not only the sameness of “Russia“ and “America“, but also the otherwise unfathomable metaphysical difference between the two.

By participating to the general program of modernity, the Production (disclosure of beings, but also mode of production)established by “Russia“ (as a generic term for socialist state capitalism) is both in-finite and finite, insofar as the historical experience of “really existing“ regimes in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, China and elsewhere is actually an attempt at re-shaping the previous social bonds not primarily in the name of the Un-limited (apeiron), or that of un-limited production of unlimited wealth,but in that of a new Limit (however “ideological“ or “false“): generalized social welfare and/or building a communist society.

Perhaps it is useless to remind here that the earthly copy of this Idea was still good enough to leave an indelible mark in the memory of people leaving in Eastern European states. This is why, in today’s Romania, for instance, many of them agree that it was better under Ceaușescu. In contemplating the landscape of desolate ruins offered by the decomposition of grand scale industry, welfare, health system, education, infrastructure, etc., these people are not heartless barbarians who wish for a reenactment of the ferocities associated with the so-called “communist“ state system, but desperate men and women who struggle for survival in the current capitalist conditions. This detail can provide a quite interesting perspective on the ideological or non-ideological nature of the “communist“ limit, placing us before a contradiction or paradox difficult to understand by “outsiders“, and this not because of some more or less absurd privilege of the “victim“, but as a result of the fact that, as it happens in any sport arena, spectators experience a game in a different manner than players on the field: the experienced truth of “really existing communism or socialism“ presents a strange mixture between a certain kind of welfare (or social security) and a certain kind of political unease (țuctuating in accordance with persons in power and historical periods). For the vast majority of people living in the so-called “communist regimes“, the memory of welfare, retained against the background of its current decomposition, makes the political aspects less relevant, all the more that with the exception of a very limited number of persons (mostly intellectuals), the matter of political freedom has been and still is less important than the harshness of survival. This is not to say that life under “communism“ was a piece of cake. It was not. However, one must not deny the actually equalitarian social mobility that re-shaped the fundaments of traditional peasant societies, building an industry and an urban development that prepared these societies for joining – a bit later – the “developing“ capitalist world. That this preparation was not as useless as the current hatred against everything “communist“ may suggest is proved not only by the possibility of the enormous brain-drain that brought to the West a great number
of ex-“communist“ specialists in all fields (from technology to social science), but also by the fact that after more than twenty years of its fall, “communist“ infrastructure (roads, railroads, block buildings, etc.), despite the destruction and the lack of maintenance caused by an increasing general poverty doubled by deregulation, still assures the functioning of the new capitalist society as a whole. Such details that one can identify through the most simple of all field works (a simple walk to “post-communist“ towns would suffice) suggest that, in a strange way, the regime of (“communist“) Finitude has actually prepared the way for the regime of the Infinite, which seems to reveal its true nature as a principle of world(ing) only after the demise of its half finite, half infinite “alternative“.

The decisive fact remains, however, that “1989“ – the year that marks, according to Granel, our entrance into the third millennium23 – removes the ideological terminal point of social development (“communist society“) and throws us into an endless development without any assignable terminal points. This is not the “end of history“ (if such an expression has a meaning at all), but history’s march towards the impossible fulfillment of its pre-established, posited conditions (“production
of limitless wealth“). The question arising from this new historical situation is, of course, not if “state capitalism“ could have actually provided a better future than its “democratic“ twin, but whether the end of hope in a better social arrangement opens our eyes to the truth of our most banal limitations in enacting the promising “thesis 11“.

What if we must return, for a second, from Marx and all theories of effective action to Heidegger and the truth of Being? What if a communist future is just as far from us as contemporary Athens is from ancient Athens? What if communism means,
in fact, the struggle for a new meaning of Being? What if the task of revolution is more difficult than overthrowing all governments of the world?

Approximately this would be, in a few questions, the meaning of an onto-historical re-reading of 1989.



 1. ‑In fact, the term “contemporary philosophy“ cannot make it clear that both Heidegger and Granel are also outside of philosophy as such, even though their thinking arises from the philosophical tradition and, most of the time, deals with it.

 2. ‑See M. Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology“, in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York and London, Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977.

 3. ‑M. Heidegger, “Letter on ’Humanism’“, in Pathmarks, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1998.

 4. ‑M. Heidegger, “Why Poets?“, in Off the Beaten Track, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 219.

 5. ‑Ibidem.

 6. ‑G. Granel, “L’Enseignement de la philosophie“, in Apolis, Mauvezin, Trans-Europ-Repress, 2009,pp. 89–90.

 7. ‑G. Granel, “La Production totale“, in Apolis, p. 75.

 8. ‑G. Granel, De l’Université, Mauvezin,T. E. R., 1982,p.126.

 9. ‑A first version of this text has been written for a seminar that took place in Paris
in October 2011.

10. ‑G. M. Tamás, “A Capitalism Pure and Simple“, in Genealogies of Post-Communism, eds. Adrian T. Sîrbu and Alexandru Polgár, Cluj, Idea, 2009, pp. 11–28.

11. ‑G. M. Tamás, “It’s All Over Now Baby Blue, Antikommunizmus ma“, .

12. ‑M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 40.

13. ‑Heidegger, “Letter on ’Humanism’“, p. 259.

14. ‑M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Albany, NY,State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 354–358.

15. ‑Heidegger, “Letter on ’Humanism’“, p. 259.

16. ‑M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, New York, Evanston and London, Harper and Row Publishers, 1968, p. 13.

17. ‑“Disclosure“ here must not be taken for “clarity“, but for the simple fact that something can appear as “clear“ or “unclear“ at all.

18. ‑G. Granel, Traditionis traditio, Paris, Gallimard, 1972,p. 229.

19. ‑Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture“, in Off the Beaten Track, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 67.

20. ‑B. Bouttes and G. Granel, Cartesiana, Mauvezin, T. E. R., 1982, pp. 134–135.

21. ‑Granel, De l’Université, pp. 125–126.

22. ‑This is one of the central thoughts of Granel’s essay “Les Années trentes sont devant nous“, in Études,Paris, Galilée, 1995.

23. ‑G. Granel, “Monoculture? Inculture?“, in Apolis, p. 78.